Excess Capacity as a Commitment to Promote Entry

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_B18B673E3682
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Excess Capacity as a Commitment to Promote Entry
Périodique
Journal of Industrial Economics
Auteur(s)
Von Ungern-Sternberg T.
ISSN
0022-1821
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
1988
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
37
Numéro
2
Pages
113-122
Langue
anglais
Résumé
Excess capacities held by a dominant firm are usually viewed as ant icompetitive because they constitute a barrier to entry. This paper explores an alternative reason for a dominant firm to hold excess capacities: they serve as an assurance to upstream (or downstream) companies that the dominant firm will not behave opportunistically once they have made their sunk investments. Excess capacities held for this reason lead to a welfare (Pareto) improvement.
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Création de la notice
19/11/2007 10:45
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 15:20
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