Introduction: Human experience takes place in the line of mental-time (MT) created through imagination of oneself in different time-points in past or future (self-projection in time). Here we manipulated self-projection in MT not only with respect to one's life-events but also with respect to one's faces from different past and future time-points.
Methods: We here compared MTT with respect to one's facial images from different time points in past and future (study 1: MT-faces) as well as with respect to different past and future life events (study 2: MT-events). Participants were asked to make judgments about past and future face images and past and future events from three different time-points: the present (Now), eight years earlier (Past) or eight years later (Future). In addition, as a control task participants were asked to make recognition judgments with respect to faces and memory-related judgments with respect to events without changing their habitual self-location in time. Behavioral measures and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) activity after subtraction of recognition and memory related activities show both absolute MT and relative MT effects for faces and events, signifying a fundamental brain mechanism of MT, disentangled from episodic memory functions.
Results: Behavioural and event-related fMRI activity showed three independent effects characterized by (1) similarity between past recollection and future imagination, (2) facilitation of judgments related to the future as compared to the past, and (3) facilitation of judgments related to time-points distant from the present. These effects were found with respect to faces and events suggesting that the brain mechanisms of MT are independent of whether actual life episodes have to be re-/pre-experienced and recruited a common cerebral network including the medial-temporal, precuneus, inferior-frontal, temporo-parietal, and insular cortices.
Conclusions: These behavioural and neural data suggest that self-projection in time is a crucial aspect of MT, relying on neural structures encoding memory, mental imagery, and self. Furthermore our results emphasize the idea that mental temporal processing is more strongly directed to future prediction than to past recollection.