Risk-selection in natural disaster insurance

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_8C9ED2C9F8CC
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Risk-selection in natural disaster insurance
Périodique
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Auteur(s)
Jametti  M., von Ungern-Sternberg  T.
ISSN
0932-4569
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
06/2010
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
166
Numéro
2
Pages
344-364
Langue
anglais
Résumé
It is widely recognized that market failure prevents efficient risk sharing in natural-disaster insurance, leading to several public private partnership arrangements across the globe. We argue that risk selection by the private partner is potentially an important issue. We illustrate our concerns with a simple model of reinsurance in a natural-disaster insurance market, based on the French system. Risk selection is a likely equilibrium outcome. Notably, the policies implemented by the French government correspond to the ones we identify to alleviate risk selection. Next, we discuss two public private partnership settings that deal effectively with risk selection: Florida and Spain. (JEL: G 22, L 11, Q 54)
Mots-clé
Health plans, Markets
Web of science
Création de la notice
27/07/2010 12:17
Dernière modification de la notice
21/08/2019 5:17
Données d'usage