Do prices transmit rationally expected information?

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_893EBBCA85FE
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Do prices transmit rationally expected information?
Périodique
Journal of the European Economic Association
Auteur(s)
Desgranges Gabriel, Geoffard Pierre-Yves, Guesnerie Roger
ISSN
1542-4766
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2003
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
1
Numéro
1
Pages
124-153
Langue
anglais
Résumé
A simple model with asymmetric information, in which inventory holders or traders submit demand curves to an auctioneer, has a unique partially revealing equilibrium. We wonder whether the agents can plausibly coordinate on this equilibrium through "eductive" reasoning relying on common knowledge. The analysis stresses the role of two effects, sensitivity and amplification, whose product should be small enough. The property is obtained whenever the equilibrium excess demand is steep enough, i.e., when the search for information does not distort demand too much. Neither the influence of the number of informed agents nor that of noise trading are monotonic. Real-time learning has strikingly different features. [Authors]
Mots-clé
Economics
Création de la notice
14/03/2008 10:21
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 14:48
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