Research question
This study aims to investigate the role of moral disengagement in individuals’ decisions to consent to match-fixing, either alone or in concert with money, other inducements, and threats or pressure. Drawing on the moral (dis)comfort component of an individual's rational-choice cost–benefit assessment, we examine the potential of moral disengagement as an explanatory mechanism.
Research methods
Data were obtained through an online questionnaire. The analysis was based on an international sample of 383 current and former athletes, coaches, referees, and board members who have reported having been approached for match-fixing in the past. The empirical evaluation employed descriptive statistics and (multiple) binary logistic regression models, which were performed using SPSS 24 software.
Results and Findings
Results indicate that a higher propensity to morally disengage can be associated with increased odds of consenting to match-fixing. These results suggest that individuals approached with a match-fixing proposal tend to employ self-defensive mechanisms to rationalise their decision to engage in match-fixing. Furthermore, the use of threats or pressure was found to have a significant impact on the decision to participate in match-fixing, both alone and in concert with (monetary) inducements and moral disengagement. While a positive significant interaction effect was observed between moral disengagement and the offer of (monetary) inducements, no significant interaction effect was noted between moral disengagement and threats or pressure.
Implications
This study offers novel individual-level explanations for match-fixing. Enriching the dominant rational-choice paradigm, this study emphasises the importance of detecting and counteracting moral disengagement mechanisms in match-fixing prevention initiatives.