Matching and the Allocation of Indivisible Objects Via Deferred Acceptance under Responsive Preferences

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Ressource 1Télécharger: BIB_85C6808708D8.P001.pdf (507.74 [Ko])
Etat: Public
Version: Final published version
ID Serval
serval:BIB_85C6808708D8
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Matching and the Allocation of Indivisible Objects Via Deferred Acceptance under Responsive Preferences
Périodique
AENORM
Auteur(s)
Klaus B.
ISSN
1568-2188
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2010
Volume
18
Numéro
67
Pages
29-32
Langue
anglais
Résumé
It is well-known that economics is the science of allocating scarce resources. Often this is done using money as our daily shopping routines confirm. Sometimes, there is more to the allocation mechanism than simple price setting and taking, but even auction mechanisms as encountered on e-bay are now well accepted rationing mechanisms.
However, there are economic problems in which using money and prices to match resources and consumers is not usually done or is considered immoral or even illegal. Examples for this type of problems are the assignments of students to public schools or universities or the assignment of transplant organs to patients who urgently need these transplants. If money cannot or should not be used to determine who gets what, how else can we decide on matching resources to consumers?
Création de la notice
01/07/2010 14:54
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 15:45
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