# Representation facilitates reasoning: what natural frequencies are and what they are not

## Détails

ID Serval

serval:BIB_84A119CF3F61

Type

**Article**: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.

Collection

Publications

Institution

Titre

Representation facilitates reasoning: what natural frequencies are and what they are not

Périodique

Cognition

ISSN

0010-0277

Statut éditorial

Publié

Date de publication

2002

Peer-reviewed

Oui

Volume

84

Numéro

3

Pages

343-352

Langue

anglais

Résumé

A good representation can be crucial for finding the solution to a problem. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (Psychol. Rev. 102 (1995) 684; Psychol. Rev. 106 (1999) 425) have shown that representations in terms of natural frequencies, rather than conditional probabilities, facilitate the computation of a cause's probability (or frequency) given an effect – a problem that is usually referred to as Bayesian reasoning. They also have shown that normalized frequencies – which are not natural frequencies – do not lead to computational facilitation, and consequently, do not enhance people's performance. Here, we correct two misconceptions propagated in recent work (Cognition 77 (2000) 197; Cognition 78 (2001) 247; Psychol. Rev. 106 (1999) 62; Organ. Behav. Hum. Decision Process. 82 (2000) 217): normalized frequencies have been mistaken for natural frequencies and, as a consequence, “nested sets” and the “subset principle” have been proposed as new explanations. These new terms, however, are nothing more than vague labels for the basic properties of natural frequencies.

Mots-clé

Bayesian inference, Probability judgements, Representation of information, Natural frequencies

Web of science

Création de la notice

24/02/2009 14:34

Dernière modification de la notice

20/08/2019 14:44