Asymmetric information and adverse selection in mauritian slave auctions

Détails

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Etat: Public
Version: Author's accepted manuscript
ID Serval
serval:BIB_7C825A19FE02
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Asymmetric information and adverse selection in mauritian slave auctions
Périodique
Review of Economic Studies
Auteur(s)
Dionne  G., St-Amour  P., Vencatachellum  D.
ISSN
0034-6527
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
10/2009
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
76
Numéro
4
Pages
1269-1295
Langue
anglais
Notes
The definitive version is available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291467-937X
Résumé
Information asymmetry is a necessary prerequisite for testing adverse selection. This paper applies this sequence of tests to Mauritian slave auctions. The theory of dynamic auctions with private and common values suggests that when an informed participant is known to be active, uninformed bidders will be more aggressive and the selling price will be higher. We conjecture that observable family links between buyer and seller entailed superior information and find a strong price premium when a related buyer purchased a slave, indicative of information asymmetry. We then test for adverse selection using sale motivation. Our results indicate large discounts on voluntary as compared to involuntary sales. Consistent with adverse selection, the market anticipated that predominantly low-productivity slaves would be brought to the market in voluntary sales.
Mots-clé
New-Orleans, Ascending auctions, Market, Lemons, Acquisition, Prices, Sales, South
Web of science
Open Access
Oui
Création de la notice
29/01/2009 16:47
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 15:38
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