This research examines the impacts of the Swiss reform of the allocation of tasks which was accepted in 2004 and implemented in 2008 to "re-assign" the responsibilities between the federal government and the cantons. The public tasks were redistributed, according to the leading and fundamental principle of subsidiarity. Seven tasks came under exclusive federal responsibility; ten came under the control of the cantons; and twenty-two "common tasks" were allocated to both the Confederation and the cantons. For these common tasks it wasn't possible to separate the management and the implementation. In order to deal with nineteen of them, the reform introduced the conventions-programs (CPs), which are public law contracts signed by the Confederation with each canton. These CPs are generally valid for periods of four years (2008-11, 2012-15 and 2016-19, respectively). The third period is currently being prepared. By using the principal-agent theory
I examine how contracts can improve political relations between a principal (Confederation) and an agent (canton). I also provide a first qualitative analysis by examining the impacts of these contracts on the vertical cooperation and on the implication of different actors by focusing my study on five CPs - protection of
cultural heritage and conservation of historic monuments, encouragement of the integration of foreigners, economic development, protection against noise and protection of the nature and landscape - applied in five cantons, which represents twenty-five cases studies.