The protectionist bias of duty drawbacks: evidence from Mercosur

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_6F7E485CD370
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
The protectionist bias of duty drawbacks: evidence from Mercosur
Périodique
Journal of International Economics
Auteur(s)
Cadot O., de Melo J., Olarreaga M.
ISSN
0022-1996
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2003
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
59
Numéro
1
Pages
161-182
Langue
anglais
Résumé
In a political-economy setting where tariffs and duty drawbacks are endogenously chosen through industry lobbying, it is shown that full duty-drawbacks are granted to exporters who use imported intermediates in their production. This in turn decreases their incentives to counter-lobby against high tariffs on their inputs. In equilibrium, higher tariffs will be observed on these goods. The creation of a regional block will change the political equilibrium. Duty-drawbacks will be eliminated on intra-regional exports, which in turn will lead to lower tariffs for goods used as inputs by intra-regional exporters. Evidence from Mercosur suggests that the elimination of duty-drawbacks for intra-regional exports led to increased counter-lobbying by users of intermediate products. In its absence the common external tariff would have been on average 3.5 percentage points (25 percent) higher.
Mots-clé
duty-drawbacks, political-economy Mercosur, new regionalism
Web of science
Création de la notice
19/11/2007 10:32
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 14:28
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