Monotonicity and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Contracts

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_6545F90DF313
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Monotonicity and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Contracts
Périodique
Economic Theory
Auteur(s)
Haake C.-J., Klaus B.
ISSN
0938-2259
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2009
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
41
Numéro
3
Pages
393-410
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (in A Econ Rev, 95(4), 913-935, 2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and implementable. Furthermore, any solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and monotonic is a supersolution of the stable correspondence. In other words, the stable correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable.
Mots-clé
Matching with contracts, Monotonicity, Nash implementation, Stability
Web of science
Création de la notice
16/03/2010 10:42
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 14:21
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