Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_62584C65C427
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics
Périodique
Games and Economic Behavior
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Ehlers L., Klaus B.
ISSN
0899-8256
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
05/2016
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
97
Pages
128-146
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogeneous objects to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties (unavailable-type-invariance, individual-rationality, weak non-wastefulness, or truncation-invariance).
In the house allocation problem, deferred-acceptance (DA)-mechanisms allocate objects based on exogenously fixed priorities, over agents. We show that DA-mechanisms are characterized by our basic properties and (i) strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity or (ii) strategy-proofness and resource-monotonicity.
Once we allow for multiple identical copies of objects, on the one hand the first characterization breaks down and there are unstable mechanisms satisfying our basic properties and (i) strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. On the other hand, our basic properties and (ii) strategy-proofness and resource-monotonicity characterize (the most general) class of DA-mechanisms based on objects' fixed choice functions that are acceptant, monotonic, substitutable, and consistent.
Mots-clé
Indivisible objects allocation, Deferred-acceptance-algorithm, Strategy-proofness, Resource-monotonicity, Population-monotonicity
Web of science
Création de la notice
11/03/2016 16:00
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 14:19
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