Bureaucracy and the flypaper effect : Evidence from intercommunal fiscal equalisation in the canton of Vaud

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Ressource 1Télécharger: BIB_61C09DEF299B.P001.pdf (415.48 [Ko])
Etat: Public
Version: Final published version
ID Serval
serval:BIB_61C09DEF299B
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Bureaucracy and the flypaper effect : Evidence from intercommunal fiscal equalisation in the canton of Vaud
Périodique
Urban Public Economics Review
Auteur(s)
Cappelletti F., Soguel N.
ISSN
1697-6223
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2013
Numéro
18
Pages
38-68
Langue
anglais
Résumé
Unlike classical theoretical expectations, our empirical study shows that financial transfers to decentralised governments increase local public expenditures much more than would be triggered by an equivalent rise in local income. This empirical evidence of the presence of a flypaper effect is achieved using panel data from 375 municipalities located in the Swiss canton of Vaud covering the period 1994 to 2005. During that time there was a major change in the financial equalisation scheme. Furthermore, our study confirms the analysis of the public choice theory: the effect depends partly on the degree of complexity of the municipal bureaucracy. These results show that local bureaucratic behaviour may impede the effectiveness of a financial equalisation scheme that aims to reduce disparities in local tax.
Mots-clé
Intergovernmental grants, flypaper effect, subnational
Création de la notice
30/07/2014 15:11
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 15:18
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