Agent model with a monopoly power : physicians

Détails

Ressource 1Télécharger: BIB_593001751D8A.P001.pdf (659.34 [Ko])
Etat: Public
Version: de l'auteur⸱e
ID Serval
serval:BIB_593001751D8A
Type
Rapport: document publié par une institution, habituellement élément d'une série.
Sous-type
Working paper: document de travail dans lequel l'auteur présente les résultats de ses travaux de recherche. Les working papers ont pour but de stimuler les discussions scientifiques avec les milieux intéressés et servent de base pour la publication d'articles dans des revues spécialisées.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Agent model with a monopoly power : physicians
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Desquins Béatrice, Holly Alberto, Rochaix Lise
Editeur
Institute of health economics and management
Détails de l'institution
IEMS
Adresse
Lausanne
Date de publication
2007
Numéro
07-01
Genre
Working paper
Langue
anglais
Nombre de pages
28
Notes
Mention de responsabiblité : / Desquins B., Holly A., Rochaix L. SAPHIRID:62827 --- Old pages value: 28 p.
Résumé
The aim of this paper is to model a liberal profession, in this case physicians. We propose a model in which the physician acts in the same way as an agent who maximises his utility function subject to his budget constraint, while at the same time being able to affect his rate of remuneration. This model presupposes that physicians attempt to reach two target, namely income and leisure, and that the trade-o between these two target depends on their monopolistic power. Unlike existing models, our proposed model advances that some physicians may have a disutility for leisure and may adopt altruistic or strategic behaviours. To determine the relevance of our model, we estimate salaried, firm and agent versions of the model based on a sample of 317 physicians practicing in the Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur region (PACA). We observe that physicians do not act like a purely profit-maximising firm. Furthermore, they are able to affect their net remuneration rate through their labour supply. The model that we propose therefore is of particular importance. We estimate that around 20% of physicians experience disutility from leisure, which can be explained by their adoption of altruistic and strategic behaviours. [Authors]
Mots-clé
Physicians , Income , Models, Econometric
Création de la notice
14/03/2008 10:12
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 14:12
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