The thesis is situated in the domain of contemporary metaphysics of science. The
question is which ontology fits best with our knowledge of the world. The method
chosen is the one of evaluating the consequences of different ontological frameworks
against the background of our scientific knowledge of the world. The thesis analyses
the two main frameworks in today's metaphysics of science, Humeanism and
dispositionalism. It advocates that only an unorthodox version of Humeanism and
only an unorthodox version of dispositionalism can be defended, the unorthodox
character of these versions consisting in taking the fundamental properties to be
relations rather than intrinsic properties. The thesis then sets out in detail what such an
unorthodox version of Humeanism amounts to.
Chapters 1 and 2 introduce the standard versions of Humeanism and dispositionalism,
focussing on the accounts of laws of nature and causation. Chapter 3 compares both
these positions and concludes that as far as the orthodox versions are concerned,
dispositionalism fares better than Humeanism, since it can avoid Humeanism's
commitments to quidditism and humility. However, as is argued in chapter 4, instead
of replying to the objections from quidditism and humility by switching to
dispositionalism, there is an unorthodox version of Humeanism available that does
not run into these problematic consequences and that is supported by science: if one
takes the fundamental physical properties to be relations instead of intrinsic
properties, the objection from quidditism is avoided, since there is no hidden intrinsic
essence of relations. As regards the objection from humility, one can maintain that
science is in principle able to provide knowledge of the fundamental relations that
there are in the world so that there is no principled ignorance. Consequently, the
thesis concludes that Humeanism and dispositionalism are on a par as regards the
remaining charge of humility. Unorthodox Humeanism provides a competitive and
adequate ontology in the light of contemporary science.