Managerial Compensation Schemes with Informed Principals

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_4E5584E3DC5B
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Managerial Compensation Schemes with Informed Principals
Périodique
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Von Ungern-Sternberg T.
ISSN
0303-9692
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2000
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
136
Numéro
4
Pages
499-512
Langue
anglais
Résumé
The paper studies managerial compensation schemes for suituations, where the current management knows more about the company's expected profitability than the new employee. When a manager is offered a contract with only a low fixed salary but high profit participation, he will be afraid that the company's profit outlook may be quite bad. Employers are aware of this. In Equilibrium the high profit employers will offer their new managers high fixed salaries and low profit participations.
Création de la notice
19/11/2007 10:26
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 14:03
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