The Relevance of the Principal-Agent Model for the Analysis of Public Policies : Do the Objectives Conflict ?

Détails

Ressource 1Télécharger: BIB_47A7A34A186B.P001.pdf (508.75 [Ko])
Etat: Public
Version: Final published version
ID Serval
serval:BIB_47A7A34A186B
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
The Relevance of the Principal-Agent Model for the Analysis of Public Policies : Do the Objectives Conflict ?
Périodique
International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences
Auteur(s)
Soguel N., Chatagny F.
ISSN
1833-1882
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2007
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
2
Numéro
1
Pages
385-392
Langue
anglais
Résumé
This paper aims to provide empirical support for the use of the principal-agent framework in the analysis of public sector and public policies. After reviewing the different conditions to be met for a relevant analysis of the relationship between population and government using the principal-agent theory, our paper focuses on the assumption of conflicting goals between the principal and the agent. A principal-agent analysis assumes in effect that inefficiencies may arise because principal and agent pursue different goals. Using data collected during an amalgamation project of two Swiss municipalities, we show the existence of a gap between the goals of the population and those of the government. Consequently, inefficiencies as predicted by the principal-agent model may arise during the implementation of a public policy, i.e. an amalgamation project. In a context of direct democracy where policies are regularly subjected to referendum, the conflict of objectives may even lead to a total failure of the policy at the polls.
Mots-clé
Principal-Agent Model, Conflicting Goals, Local Government, Public Policy, Amalgamation, Direct Democracy
Création de la notice
18/07/2014 10:49
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 13:54
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