Personnel selection as a signaling game

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_450493D2B5D9
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Personnel selection as a signaling game
Périodique
Journal of Applied Psychology
Auteur(s)
Bangerter  A., Roulin  N., König  C.J.
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2012
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
97
Numéro
4
Pages
719-738
Langue
anglais
Résumé
Personnel selection involves exchanges of information between job market actors (applicants and organizations). These actors do not have an incentive to exchange accurate information about their ability and commitment to the employment relationship unless it is to their advantage. This state of affairs explains numerous phenomena in personnel selection (e.g., faking). Signaling theory describes a mechanism by which parties with partly conflicting interests (and thus an incentive for deception) can nevertheless exchange accurate information. We apply signaling theory to personnel selection, distinguishing between adaptive relationships between applicants and organizations, among applicants, and among organizations. In each case, repeated adaptations and counteradaptations between actors can lead to situations of equilibrium or escalation (arms races). We show that viewing personnel selection as a network of adaptive relationships among job market actors enables an understanding of both classic and underexplored micro- and macro-level selection phenomena and their dynamic interactions.
Mots-clé
personnel selection, signaling theory, information exchange, adaptation, faking
Création de la notice
31/10/2011 17:22
Dernière modification de la notice
21/08/2019 6:12
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