Median Stable Matching for College Admissions

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_3E23C7BFB75B
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Median Stable Matching for College Admissions
Périodique
International Journal of Game Theory
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Klaus B., Klijn F.
ISSN
0020-7276
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2006
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
34
Numéro
1
Pages
1-11
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.
Mots-clé
Matching, College admissions, Stability, Fairness
Web of science
Création de la notice
11/05/2010 14:17
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 13:34
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