Dynamic production teams with strategic behavior

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_3C7B4642C212
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Dynamic production teams with strategic behavior
Périodique
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Breton M., St-Amour P., Vencatachellum D.
ISSN
0165-1889
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
03/2003
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
27
Numéro
5
Pages
875-905
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We analyze if intergenerational teams reveal workers' productivities. Some uncertainty on agents' productivities persists when (i) each agent must work independently, or (ii) technological shocks are agent-specific in compulsory teams. However, when technological shocks are team-specific in compulsory teams, each worker's productivity is revealed. When agents choose to work independently or in teams, that problem falls in the class of dynamic games. Elective teams are preferred by high-productivity young workers when the technological shocks are agent-specific, and maximize the expected utility of a young worker when shocks are team-specific.
Mots-clé
Adverse selection, Dynamic games, Reputation, Team production
Web of science
Création de la notice
30/04/2008 15:03
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 13:32
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