War and Natural Resource Exploitation

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_384E5AC0D964
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
War and Natural Resource Exploitation
Périodique
European Economic Review
Auteur(s)
van der Ploeg F., Rohner D.
ISSN
0014-2921
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
11/2012
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
56
Numéro
8
Pages
1714-1729
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We build a theoretical framework that allows for endogenous conflict behaviour (i.e., fighting efforts) and for endogenous natural resource exploitation (i.e., speed, ownership, and investments). While depletion is spread in a balanced Hotelling fashion during peace, the presence of conflict creates incentives for rapacious extraction, as this lowers the stakes of future contest. This voracious extraction depresses total oil revenue, especially if world oil demand is relatively elastic and the government's weapon advantage is weak. Some of these political distortions can be overcome by bribing rebels or by government investment in weapons. The shadow of conflict can also make less efficient nationalized oil extraction more attractive than private extraction, as insecure property rights create a holdup problem for the private firm and lead to a lower license fee. Furthermore, the government fights less intensely than the rebels under private exploitation, which leads to more government turnover. Without credible commitment to future fighting efforts, private oil depletion is only lucrative if the government's non-oil office rents are large and weaponry powerful, which guarantees the government a stronger grip on office and makes the holdup problem less severe.
Mots-clé
Conflict, Natural resources, Voracious extraction, Private resource exploitation, Exploration investment, License fee, Rebels
Web of science
Création de la notice
12/10/2012 14:32
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 13:27
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