The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_37671
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors
Périodique
Swiss Political Science Review
Auteur(s)
Gilardi F.
ISSN
1424-7755
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2005
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
11
Numéro
4
Pages
139-167
Langue
anglais
Résumé
This article seeks to explain the pattern of delegation to independent regulatory agencies in Western Europe. Two types of arguments are advanced to explain variations in the formal independence of regulators. Firstly, the need for governments to increase their credible commitment capacity may lead them to delegate regulation to an agency that is partly beyond their direct control. Secondly, delegation may be a response to the political uncertainty problem, which arises when governments are afraid of being replaced by another coalition with different preferences, which could decide to change existing policy choices. In addition, veto players may constitute a functional equivalent of delegation, since they influence policy stability and therefore tend to mitigate both the credibility and the political uncertainty problems. These arguments are consistent with the results of the empirical analysis of the formal independence of regulators in seventeen countries and seven sectors.
Mots-clé
delegation, regulation, regulatory policy, independent regulatory agencies
Web of science
Open Access
Oui
Création de la notice
19/11/2007 11:12
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 14:25
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