Preemptive Bidding, Target Resistance, and Takeover Premiums
Détails
![Ressource 1](https://serval.unil.ch/static/img/forbidden.png)
Etat: Supprimée
Version: de l'auteur⸱e
ID Serval
serval:BIB_34F920EEBB5C
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Preemptive Bidding, Target Resistance, and Takeover Premiums
Périodique
Journal of Financial Economics
ISSN
0304-405X
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
12/2014
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
114
Numéro
3
Pages
444-470
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We evaluate empirically two sources of large takeover premiums: preemptive bidding and target resistance. We develop an auction model that features costly sequential entry of bidders in takeover contests and encompasses both explanations. We estimate the model parameters by simulated method of moments for a sample of US takeovers. Our estimates imply that target resistance explains the entire magnitude of the premium in 74% of successful single-bidder contests. Simulation experiments show that initial bidders have, on average, a higher valuation for the target than rival bidders, so that a relatively low initial bid is sufficient to deter a rival from entry.
Mots-clé
Mergers and acquisitions, auctions target resistance, preemptive bidding, structural estimation
Web of science
Création de la notice
13/01/2012 16:26
Dernière modification de la notice
21/08/2019 6:12