The effectiveness of top-down advice in strategy-proof mechanisms: A field experiment

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_344BA97F9493
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
The effectiveness of top-down advice in strategy-proof mechanisms: A field experiment
Périodique
European Economic Review
Auteur(s)
Guillen P., Hakimov R.
ISSN
0014-2921
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
01/2018
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
101
Pages
505-511
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We run a field experiment to test the truth-telling rates of the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles mechanism (TTC) under different information conditions. First, we asked first-year economics students enrolled in an introductory microeconomics unit about which topic, among three, they would most like to write an essay on. Most students chose the same favorite topic. Then we used TTC to distribute students equally across the three options. We ran three treatments varying the information the students received about the mechanism. In the first treatment students were given a description of the matching mechanism. In the second they received a description of the strategy-proofness property without details of the mechanism. Finally, in the third, they were given both pieces of information. We find a significant and positive effect of describing the strategy-proofness on truth-telling rates. On the other hand, describing the matching mechanism has a negative effect on truth-telling.
Mots-clé
Economics and Econometrics, Finance
Web of science
Création de la notice
01/11/2018 12:39
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 14:20
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