Self-deception as affective coping. An empirical perspective on philosophical issues.

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_32CF856ECC26
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Self-deception as affective coping. An empirical perspective on philosophical issues.
Périodique
Consciousness and cognition
Auteur(s)
Lauria F., Preissmann D., Clément F.
ISSN
1090-2376 (Electronic)
ISSN-L
1053-8100
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
04/2016
Volume
41
Pages
119-134
Langue
anglais
Notes
Publication types: Journal Article ; Review
Publication Status: ppublish
Résumé
In the philosophical literature, self-deception is mainly approached through the analysis of paradoxes. Yet, it is agreed that self-deception is motivated by protection from distress. In this paper, we argue, with the help of findings from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, that self-deception is a type of affective coping. First, we criticize the main solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception. We then present a new approach to self-deception. Self-deception, we argue, involves three appraisals of the distressing evidence: (a) appraisal of the strength of evidence as uncertain, (b) low coping potential and (c) negative anticipation along the lines of Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis. At the same time, desire impacts the treatment of flattering evidence via dopamine. Our main proposal is that self-deception involves emotional mechanisms provoking a preference for immediate reward despite possible long-term negative repercussions. In the last part, we use this emotional model to revisit the philosophical paradoxes.

Mots-clé
Adaptation, Psychological/physiology, Choice Behavior/physiology, Deception, Dopamine/physiology, Ego, Humans, Reward
Pubmed
Création de la notice
27/02/2016 14:09
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 13:18
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