How to Model Heterogeneity in Costly Punishment: Insights from Responders' Response Times

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_300C5C700691
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
How to Model Heterogeneity in Costly Punishment: Insights from Responders' Response Times
Périodique
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Fischbacher U., Hertwig R., Bruhin A.
ISSN
0894-3257
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
12/2013
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
26
Numéro
5
Pages
462-476
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We investigate what processes may underlie heterogeneity in social preferences. We address this question by examining participants' decisions and associated response times across 12 mini-ultimatum games. Using a finite mixture model and cross-validating its classification with a response time analysis, we identified four groups of responders: one group takes little to no account of the proposed split or the foregone allocation and swiftly accepts any positive offer; two groups process primarily the objective properties of the allocations (fairness and kindness) and need more time the more properties need to be examined; and a fourth group, which takes more time than the others, appears to take into account what they would have proposed had they been put in the role of the proposer. We discuss implications of this joint decision-response time analysis.
Mots-clé
ultimatum game, response time, finite mixture model, heterogeneity, altruistic punishment, response time, heuristics
Web of science
Création de la notice
21/11/2012 19:36
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 13:14
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