Prudence and Success in Politics

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_29027
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Prudence and Success in Politics
Périodique
Economics and Politics
Auteur(s)
Cadot O., Desgagné B.
ISSN
0954-1985
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
07/1992
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
4
Numéro
2
Pages
171-189
Langue
anglais
Résumé
The paper considers a repeated election game between an infinitely-lived representative voter and finitely-lived, heterogeneous politicians. The voter's prior belief about the incumbent's competency is updated during the incumbent's first term in office. The voter's problem is to find a rule that simultaneously selects and controls politicians. We show that the simple performance rule, standard in the literature, is justified as a time-consistent rule for a forward-looking voter. The outcome of a large class of perfect equilibria is “strategic caution”: incumbent politicians slow down the voter's Bayesian learning by taking only weakly informative actions.
Création de la notice
19/11/2007 10:56
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 14:08
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