Hospital ownership, reimbursement systems and mortality rates

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_2250407679F1
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Hospital ownership, reimbursement systems and mortality rates
Périodique
Health Economics
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Milcent Carine
ISSN
1057-9230
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2005
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
14
Numéro
11
Pages
1151-1168
Langue
anglais
Notes
SAPHIRID:62485
Résumé
This paper analyses the effect of ownership and system of reimbursement on mortality rates. From the statistical results we could conclude that the incentive created by fee-for-service reimbursement yields a four-point reduction in the mortality rate. However, this ranking of hospital quality is completely dependent on the characteristics and illness severity of patients. To take this difficulty into account, we use an innovative duration model applied to panel data: a duration model with both patient and hospital unobserved heterogeneity. No distributional assumptions are made regarding the latter. By this way, we control the fact that patients admitted to the private sector can be different in terms of disease severity from patients admitted to the public sector. The capacity to perform innovative procedures has more effect on the mortality than the system of reimbursement and/or ownership. As such, private sector hospitals that perform more innovative procedures provide a better quality of care, measured by the probability of dying. Nevertheless, heterogeneity within hospitals is greater in for-profit hospitals than in other types of hospital. This suggests that, by choosing a for-profit hospital, patients have on average a lower instantaneous probability of dying but are less sure about the quality of the hospital. [Ed.]
Mots-clé
Hospital Mortality , Hospitals, Private , Hospitals, Public , Reimbursement Mechanisms
Pubmed
Création de la notice
14/03/2008 10:12
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 12:59
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