Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_19CBE2D17105
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object
Périodique
Games and Economic Behavior
Auteur(s)
Klaus B.
ISSN
0899-8256
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2001
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
34
Numéro
1
Pages
64-82
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We study two allocation models. In the first model, we consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-dipped preferences. In the second model, a degenerate case of the first one, we study the allocation of an indivisible object to a group of agents. Our main result is the characterization of the class of Pareto optimal and coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rules. Alternatively, this class of rules, which largely consists of serially dictatorial components, can be characterized by Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, and weak non-bossiness tin terms of welfare). Furthermore, we study properties of fairness such as anonymity and no-envy.
Mots-clé
Single-dipped preferences, (Coalitional) strategy-proofness, Non-bossiness in terms of welfare, Serial-dictatorship
Web of science
Création de la notice
11/05/2010 15:36
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 13:50
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