Credit Reporting, Relationship Banking, and Loan Repayment

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_16C572BD6A4D
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Credit Reporting, Relationship Banking, and Loan Repayment
Périodique
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Brown M., Zehnder C.
ISSN
0022-2879
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
12/2007
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
39
Numéro
8
Pages
1883-1918
Langue
anglais
Résumé
How does information sharing between lenders affect borrowers repayment behavior ? We show-in a laboratory credit market-that information sharing increases repayment rates, as borrowers anticipate that a good credit record improves their access to credit. This incentive effect of information sharing is substantial when repayment is not third-party enforceable and lending is dominated by one-shot transactions. If, however, repeat interaction between borrowers and lenders is feasible, the incentive effect of credit reporting is negligible, as bilateral banking relationships discipline borrowers. Information sharing nevertheless affects market outcome by weakening lenders' ability to extract rents from relationships.
Mots-clé
credit market, information sharing, relationship banking
Web of science
Création de la notice
16/09/2008 10:14
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 13:46
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