Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games.

Détails

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Etat: Public
Version: Final published version
ID Serval
serval:BIB_0FEB8A19E422
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games.
Périodique
Journal of Theoretical Biology
Auteur(s)
Peña J., Lehmann L., Nöldeke G.
ISSN
1095-8541 (Electronic)
ISSN-L
0022-5193
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2014
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
346
Pages
23-33
Langue
anglais
Résumé
In this paper we unify, simplify, and extend previous work on the evolutionary dynamics of symmetric N-player matrix games with two pure strategies. In such games, gains from switching strategies depend, in general, on how many other individuals in the group play a given strategy. As a consequence, the gain function determining the gradient of selection can be a polynomial of degree N-1. In order to deal with the intricacy of the resulting evolutionary dynamics, we make use of the theory of polynomials in Bernstein form. This theory implies a tight link between the sign pattern of the gains from switching on the one hand and the number and stability of the rest points of the replicator dynamics on the other hand. While this relationship is a general one, it is most informative if gains from switching have at most two sign changes, as is the case for most multi-player matrix games considered in the literature. We demonstrate that previous results for public goods games are easily recovered and extended using this observation. Further examples illustrate how focusing on the sign pattern of the gains from switching obviates the need for a more involved analysis.
Pubmed
Web of science
Open Access
Oui
Création de la notice
03/10/2013 13:59
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 12:36
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