Quality Incentives in Auctions for Construction Contracts

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_0CFC6FE2208E
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Quality Incentives in Auctions for Construction Contracts
Périodique
International Journal of Industrial Organisation
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Von Ungern-Sternberg T.
ISSN
0167-7187
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
1994
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
12
Numéro
1
Pages
89-104
Langue
anglais
Résumé
Construction projects are frequently awarded on the basis of auctions. The winning project is selected not only on the basis of price, but also a variety of quality characteristics. Coming up with a high-quality project may require (substantial) up-front investments. This paper studies the relative weight the auctioneer should attach to quality when selecting the winning project. It is shown that the optimal weight may be substantially higher than his own marginal utility of quality. As a result it may be quite difficult to detect favouritism in the process of selecting the winner.
Web of science
Création de la notice
19/11/2007 9:28
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 12:34
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