The evolution of judgement bias in indirect reciprocity.

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_EE79C8B1591C
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
The evolution of judgement bias in indirect reciprocity.
Journal
Proceedings. Biological Sciences / The Royal Society
Author(s)
Rankin D.J., Eggimann Philippe
ISSN
0962-8452
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2009
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
276
Number
1660
Pages
1339-1345
Language
english
Abstract
Indirect reciprocity is a form of reciprocity where help is given to individuals based on their reputation. In indirect reciprocity, bad acts (such as not helping) reduce an individual's reputation while good acts (such as helping) increase an individual's reputation. Studies of indirect reciprocity assume that good acts and bad acts are weighted equally when assessing the reputation of an individual. As different information can be processed in different ways, this is not likely to be the case, and it is possible that an individual could bias an actor's reputation by putting more weight to acts of defection (not helping) than acts of co-operation (helping) or vice versa. We term this difference 'judgement bias', and build an individual-based model of image scoring to investigate the conditions under which it may evolve. We find that, if the benefits of co-operation are small, judgement bias is weighted towards acts perceived to be bad; if the benefits are high, the reverse is true. Our result is consistent under both scoring and standing strategies, and we find that allowing judgement bias to evolve increases the level of co-operation in the population.
Keywords
Altruism, Computer Simulation, Cooperative Behavior, Evolution, Models, Biological
Pubmed
Web of science
Create date
29/12/2009 16:18
Last modification date
20/08/2019 17:16
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