Strategy-Proof Division with Single-Peaked Preferences and Individual Endowments

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_EB6174DAB1FE
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Title
Strategy-Proof Division with Single-Peaked Preferences and Individual Endowments
Journal
Social Choice and Welfare
Author(s)
Klaus B., Peters H., Storcken T.
ISSN
0176-1714
Publication state
Published
Issued date
1998
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
15
Number
2
Pages
297-311
Language
english
Abstract
We consider the problem of(re)allocating the total endowment of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments. We propose an extension of the so-called uniform rule and show that it is the unique rule satisfying Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, reversibility, and an equal-treatment condition. The resulting rule turns out to be peaks-only and individually rational: the allocation assigned by the rule depends only on the peaks of the preferences, and no agent is worse off than at his individual endowment.
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Create date
25/05/2010 14:17
Last modification date
20/08/2019 16:13
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