Subsidy design: wealth versus benefits

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Serval ID
serval:BIB_D04BB98A531C
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Subsidy design: wealth versus benefits
Journal
Journal of Economics
Author(s)
Grassi  S., Ma  C.A.
ISSN
0931-8658
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2010
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
101
Number
1
Pages
49-72
Language
english
Abstract
A government would like to subsidize an indivisible good. Consumers' valuations of the good vary according to their wealth and benefits from the good. A subsidy scheme may be based on consumers' wealth or benefit information. We translate a wealth-based policy to a benefit-based policy, and vice versa, and give a necessary and sufficient condition for the pair of policies to implement the same assignment: consumers choose to purchase the good under the wealth-based policy if and only if they choose to do so under the translated benefit-based policy. General taxation allows equivalent policies to require the same budget.
Keywords
Subsidy design, Wealth-based policies, Benefit-based policies, Assignment set, Translation between subsidy policies, Equivalence between subsidy policies, Cost-effectiveness, Means-testing, PUBLIC-EXPENDITURES, TRANSFERS, INCOME
Web of science
Open Access
Yes
Create date
23/09/2010 10:36
Last modification date
01/10/2019 6:19
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