Financial development in adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems

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Serval ID
serval:BIB_C6C1C6DB2500
Type
Report: a report published by a school or other institution, usually numbered within a series.
Publication sub-type
Working paper: Working papers contain results presented by the author. Working papers aim to stimulate discussions between scientists with interested parties, they can also be the basis to publish articles in specialized journals
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Publications
Institution
Title
Financial development in adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems
Author(s)
Massenot B.
Institution details
Université de Lausanne - HEC - DEEP
Issued date
11/2010
Number
10.13
Genre
Cahiers de recherches économiques
Language
english
Number of pages
29
Abstract
This paper analyzes how the adversarial and inquisitorial evidence collection procedures affect financial development. In investigating the true returns of insolvent entrepreneurs, the adversarial procedure relies on lawyers whereas the inquisitorial procedure relies on judges. Investors are willing to lend more in adversarial than in inquisitorial legal systems if they are richer than entrepreneurs or if lawyers are more productive than judges. Manipulation of evidence by lawyers has an ambiguous impact on finance. The empirical evidence shows that a more inquisitorial procedure is associated with less developed financial markets.
Keywords
adversarial, inquisitorial, financial development, legal origins
Create date
11/01/2011 17:54
Last modification date
21/08/2019 6:10
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