Can we see inside? Predicting strategic behavior given limited information
Details
Serval ID
serval:BIB_C3ABBF1CF131
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Can we see inside? Predicting strategic behavior given limited information
Journal
Evolution and Human Behavior
ISSN
1090-5138
Publication state
Published
Issued date
07/2013
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
34
Number
4
Pages
258-264
Language
english
Abstract
Evolutionary theory predicts that observable traits should evolve to reliably indicate unobservable behavioral tendencies in coordination games but not social dilemmas. We conducted a two-part study to test this idea. First, we recorded 60-s videos of participants, and then these participants played a stag hunt game or a prisoner’s dilemma. Subsequently, raters viewed these videos, with the sound either off or on, and they guessed player choices. Raters showed a significant tendency to guess that attractive players chose stag. In contrast to the prediction, rater accuracy was at chance regardless of whether the sound of the video was off or on. For prisoner’s dilemma players, raters showed a significant tendency to guess that women cooperated at a higher rate than men. Again in contrast to the prediction, accuracy was significantly above chance in this case. To calibrate the importance of this accuracy rate, we developed two models that suggest the accuracy we observed in the prisoner’s dilemma case is probably not high enough to support the evolution of cooperation. Altogether, our results show that raters tried to achieve a meaningful degree of accuracy about players by using the limited information available in the videos, but they could not do so.
Keywords
Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous), Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics
Web of science
Create date
14/02/2019 7:50
Last modification date
21/08/2019 5:14