Leniency Programs in a Multimarket Setting: Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus

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Serval ID
serval:BIB_BD7D397E26B2
Type
Report: a report published by a school or other institution, usually numbered within a series.
Publication sub-type
Working paper: Working papers contain results presented by the author. Working papers aim to stimulate discussions between scientists with interested parties, they can also be the basis to publish articles in specialized journals
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Publications
Institution
Title
Leniency Programs in a Multimarket Setting: Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus
Author(s)
Roux C., von Ungern-Sternberg T.
Institution details
Université de Lausanne - HEC - DEEP
Issued date
05/2007
Number
07.03
Genre
Cahiers de recherches économiques
Language
english
Number of pages
22
Abstract
We examine the effect of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on firms' initial selfreporting decision, in one market, by altering their whistle-blowing incentives in another market. Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus are proactive US strategies which aim at triggering multiple confessions by increasing the incentives of already convicted firms to report in a second market where they collude. Predictably, conditional on the conviction of one cartel, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus strengthen firms' incentives to report the remaining cartel. However, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus have an ambiguous impact on firms' incentives to apply for amnesty in the first place: On the one hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may help to sustain a cartel, otherwise reported under the EC Leniency Program. On the other hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may induce immediate reporting of both cartels whereas only one of them would have been reported under the EC Leniency Program.
Keywords
Amnesty Plus, Leniency Program, Multimarket Contact, Self-reporting
Create date
13/08/2013 15:25
Last modification date
21/08/2019 6:10
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