Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_BABF543881D5
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices
Journal
Economic Theory
Author(s)
Klaus Bettina, Nichifor Alexandru
ISSN
0938-2259
1432-0479
Publication state
Published
Issued date
10/2020
Volume
70
Number
3
Pages
665-684
Language
english
Abstract
We propose a new set of mechanisms, which we call serial dictatorship mechanisms with individual reservation prices for the allocation of homogeneous indivisible objects, e.g., specialist clinic appointments. We show that a mechanism φ satisfies minimal tradability, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, independence of unallocated objects, and non-wasteful tie-breaking if and only if there exists a reservation price vector r and a priority ordering ≻ such that φ is a serial dictatorship mechanism with reservation prices based on r and ≻. We obtain a second characterization by replacing individual rationality with non-imposition. In both our characterizations r, ≻, and φ are all found simultaneously and endogenously from the properties. Finally, we illustrate how our model, mechanism, and results capture the normative requirements governing the functioning of some real-life markets and the mechanisms that these markets use.
Keywords
Economics and Econometrics
Web of science
Funding(s)
Swiss National Science Foundation / Projects / 100018_162606
Create date
08/11/2019 10:28
Last modification date
30/09/2020 5:26
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