Iterative Versus Standard Deferred Acceptance: Experimental Evidence★

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_B989BB444B1A
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Title
Iterative Versus Standard Deferred Acceptance: Experimental Evidence★
Journal
The Economic Journal
Author(s)
 Inácio, Hakimov Rustamdjan
ISSN
0013-0133
1468-0297
Publication state
Published
Issued date
25/07/2019
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
130
Number
626
Language
english
Abstract
We run laboratory experiments where subjects are matched to colleges, and colleges are not strategic agents. We test the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching mechanism in which students make applications one at a time. We consider two variations of IDAM: one in which students are only informed of whether they have been tentatively accepted or not (IDAM-NC) and one in which, at each step, they are also informed of the tentative cutoff values for acceptance at each college (IDAM). A significantly higher proportion of stable outcomes is reached both under IDAM and IDAM-NC than under DA. The difference can be explained by a higher proportion of subjects following an equilibrium truthful strategy under iterative mechanisms than the truthful reporting under DA. We associate the benefits of iterative mechanisms relative to DA with the feedback of the outcome of applications provided between steps of the iterative mechanisms. This feedback allows subjects to learn that deviating strategies from truthful do not work as intended.
Keywords
Economics and Econometrics
Create date
01/11/2018 11:53
Last modification date
25/05/2020 15:36
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