The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_B7E8A2A3FA43
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Title
The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.
Journal
Proceedings of the Royal Society. B Biological Sciences
Author(s)
dos Santos M.
ISSN
1471-2954 (Electronic)
ISSN-L
0962-8452
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2015
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
282
Number
1798
Pages
20141994
Language
english
Abstract
Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.
Keywords
cooperation, pool rewards, evolutionary games, social dilemmas
Pubmed
Web of science
Open Access
Yes
Create date
21/10/2014 11:17
Last modification date
20/08/2019 16:26
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