A Dynamic Recontracting Process for Multiple-Type Housing Markets

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_9C52982DFF0D
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
A Dynamic Recontracting Process for Multiple-Type Housing Markets
Journal
Journal of Mathematical Economics
Author(s)
Klaus B., Bochet O., Walzl M.
ISSN
0304-4068
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2011
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
47
Number
1
Pages
84-98
Language
english
Abstract
We consider multiple-type housing markets. To capture the dynamic aspect of trade in such markets, we study a dynamic recontracting process similar to the one introduced by Serrano and Volij (2008). First, we analyze the set of recurrent classes of this process as a (non-empty) solution concept. We show that each core allocation always constitutes a singleton recurrent class and provide examples of non-singleton recurrent classes consisting of blocking-cycles of individually rational allocations. For multiple-type housing markets stochastic stability never serves as a selection device among recurrent classes.
Next, we propose a method to compute the limit invariant distribution of the dynamic recontracting process. Furthermore, we discuss how the limit invariant distribution is influenced by the relative coalitional stability and accessibility of the different stochastically stable allocations. We illustrate our findings with several examples. In particular, we demonstrate that some core allocations are less likely to be final allocations of the dynamic process than cycles composed of non-core allocations.
Keywords
Core, Indivisible goods, Limit invariant distribution, Stochastic stability
Web of science
Create date
01/02/2011 9:11
Last modification date
20/08/2019 15:03
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