Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability

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Serval ID
serval:BIB_942B9E9CB139
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
UNIL/CHUV
Title
Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
Author(s)
Klaus Bettina, Klijn Flip
ISSN
0899-8256
Publication state
Published
Issued date
07/2017
Volume
104
Pages
222-229
Language
english
Keywords
Economics and Econometrics, Finance
OAI-PMH
oai:serval.unil.ch:BIB_942B9E9CB139
DOI
10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.001
Web of science
000408296200012
Create date
08/05/2019 17:54
Last modification date
21/08/2019 6:16
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