Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and rommate markets

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Serval ID
serval:BIB_8FC4D31DAB75
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and rommate markets
Journal
Social Choice and Welfare
Author(s)
Can B., Klaus B.
ISSN
0176-1714
Publication state
Published
Issued date
10/2013
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
41
Number
4
Pages
835-862
Language
english
Abstract
We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. Klaus (Games Econ Behav 72:172-186, 2011) introduced two new "population sensitivity" properties that capture the effect newcomers have on incumbent agents: competition sensitivity and resource sensitivity. On various roommate market domains (marriage markets, no-odd-rings roommate markets, solvable roommate markets),we characterize the core using either of the population sensitivity properties in addition to weak unanimity and consistency. On the domain of all roommate markets, we obtain two associated impossibility results.
Web of science
Open Access
Yes
Create date
08/11/2012 10:45
Last modification date
01/10/2019 7:18
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