What signals do employers use when hiring? Evidence from a survey experiment in the apprenticeship market

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_80CC41863805
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
What signals do employers use when hiring? Evidence from a survey experiment in the apprenticeship market
Journal
European Sociological Review
Author(s)
Fossati Flavia, Wilson Anna, Bonoli Giuliano
Publication state
Published
Issued date
09/05/2020
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Language
english
Abstract
How do employers use different types of signals – that is, information believed to be associated with productivity – when hiring apprentices? We use a survey experiment in Switzerland – a country with a well-developed dual training system – to study employers’ hiring behaviour. The results reveal that whenever possible, employers resort to direct signals, i.e., information such as educational credentials and aptitude test scores, when making hiring decisions. However, in contexts of high uncertainty, notably, when candidates’ profiles convey ambiguous signals, they are more likely to use probabilistic signals, such as socio-economic status indicators, to complement their assessments. Consequently, in contexts of high uncertainty, candidates with lower socio-economic status are more likely to be discriminated against in the apprenticeship market
Create date
23/03/2020 19:08
Last modification date
16/05/2020 6:22
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