A constraint-based framework to study competition and cooperation in fishing

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State: Public
Version: Author's accepted manuscript
Serval ID
serval:BIB_741710C90F46
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
A constraint-based framework to study competition and cooperation in fishing
Journal
Fisheries Research
Author(s)
Mullon Christian, Mullon Charles
ISSN
0165-7836
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2018
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
203
Pages
74-83
Language
english
Abstract
In this paper, we present a simple framework to study competition, cooperation and bargaining options among fisheries when they operate under financial and technological constraints. Competition within constraints leads to a particular type of mathematical game in which the strategy choice by one player changes the strategy set of the other. By studying the equilibria and bargaining space of this game when players maximize either profit or yield, we show that differences in financial constraints among players lead to a tougher play, with a reduced bargaining space as the least constrained player can readily exclude another from the competition. The exacerbating effects of constraints on competition are particularly strong when players maximize yield. We discuss the significance of our results for fisheries management in a current context of financialization and technological development. We suggest that in order to maximize the chances of fruitful negotiations and aim towards a fair sharing of sea resources, it would be helpful to focus on leveling current differences in the constraints faced between competing fishing systems, notably by supporting local financial systems and technological control.
Keywords
Fisheries Competition Cooperation Constraints Financialization
Web of science
Create date
16/10/2017 17:27
Last modification date
20/08/2019 15:31
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