Population-Monotonicity and Separability for Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_6DADB343584A
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Title
Population-Monotonicity and Separability for Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object
Journal
Economic Theory
Author(s)
Klaus B.
ISSN
0938-2259
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2001
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
17
Number
3
Pages
675-692
Language
english
Abstract
We study two allocation models. In the first model, we consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-dipped preferences. In the second model, a degenerate case of the first one, we study the allocation of an indivisible object to a group of agents.
We consider rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and in addition either the consistency property separability or the solidarity property population-monotonicity.
We show that the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and separability equals the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness. We also provide characterizations of all rules satisfying Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and either separability or population-monotonicity. Since any such rule consists for the largest part of serial-dictatorship components, we can interpret the characterizations as impossibility results.
Keywords
Strategy-proofness, Serial-dictatorship, Population-monotonicity, Separability, Non-bossiness
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Create date
11/05/2010 15:37
Last modification date
20/08/2019 15:27
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