Conflicting Interests in the Timing of Jobs

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_6ACCA1671E78
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Title
Conflicting Interests in the Timing of Jobs
Journal
Management Science
Author(s)
van Ackere A.
ISSN
0025-1909
Publication state
Published
Issued date
1990
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
36
Number
8
Pages
970-984
Language
english
Abstract
We study a situation where jobs of unknown duration (e.g., surgical procedures) are performed sequentially in a single facility (e.g., a hospital operating room). This facility can be any resource (material or human) that is in limited supply. Due to the uncertain duration of jobs, the time at which the facility will be available for the next job is unknown. Given the existing schedule, a starting time is selected for the next job. The scheduler's task is complicated because a job necessitates the presence of (at least) one individual (e.g., the surgeon), called the agent.
We model this situation as a game between the scheduler and the agent. The scheduler trades off the cost associated with keeping the facility idle between jobs against the cost of keeping the agent waiting. The agent trades off his waiting cost against his lateness cost. We determine the conditions under which it is necessary for the scheduler to take the agent's behavior into account. We introduce moral hazard by assuming that the agent's arrival time is random and compare this to the case where the agent selects a deterministic arrival time.
Keywords
Scheduling, moral hazard, services
Create date
02/06/2009 14:46
Last modification date
20/08/2019 14:25
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