Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups

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State: Public
Version: Author's accepted manuscript
Serval ID
serval:BIB_692453B9B556
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Title
Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups
Journal
Evolution and Human Behavior
Author(s)
dos Santos M., Wedekind C.
ISSN
1090-5138
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2015
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
36
Number
1
Pages
59-64
Language
english
Abstract
Cooperation among unrelated individuals can arise if decisions to help others can be based on reputation. While working for dyadic interactions, reputation-use in social dilemmas involving many individuals (e.g. public goods games) becomes increasingly difficult as groups become larger and errors more frequent. Reputation is therefore believed to have played a minor role for the evolution of cooperation in collective action dilemmas such as those faced by early humans. Here, we show in computer simulations that a reputation system based on punitive actions can overcome these problems and, compared to reputation system based on generous actions, (i) is more likely to lead to the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups, (ii) more effectively sustains cooperation within larger groups, and (iii) is more robust to errors in reputation assessment. Punishment and punishment reputation could therefore have played crucial roles in the evolution of cooperation within larger groups of humans.
Keywords
Game theory, Public goods game, Collective action dilemmas, Reputation, Punishment, Indirect reciprocity
Web of science
Open Access
Yes
Create date
01/09/2014 20:22
Last modification date
20/08/2019 15:24
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