Do Nasty and Pleasant Surprises Regarding Tax Revenue Explain Spending Drifts ? : The Case of the Swiss Cantons

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_5ACDF8DF2DA8
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Do Nasty and Pleasant Surprises Regarding Tax Revenue Explain Spending Drifts ? : The Case of the Swiss Cantons
Journal
International Journal of Public Administration
Author(s)
Soguel N., Ecabert C.
ISSN
0190-0692 (Print)
1532-4265 (Electronic)
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2015
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
38
Number
4
Pages
282-296
Language
english
Abstract
This article aims to explain the difference between the expenditure reported in governmental end-of-the-year budgets and the amounts previously forecasted in the approved beginning-of-the-year budgets. We measure how political, financial, and institutional variables affect this spending drift. We focus on two much-debated factors, namely, tax revenue budgeting errors and the stringency of fiscal rules. Our econometric approach uses a panel based on the 26 Swiss cantons covering the period of 1980 to 2011. Results suggest that stringent fiscal rules discourage budget overruns, whereas underestimating tax revenue-i.e., a budgetary "pleasant surprise"-offers the opportunity for some overspending.
Create date
02/03/2015 9:28
Last modification date
20/08/2019 15:13
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